Counter-revolution and sectarian strife
Plenty of people, but mostly thugs who lived off the former regime, will stop at nothing to halt what has begun, writes Ammar Ali Hassan*
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Orchestrated by the men of the former regime, the Battle of the Camel is a flagrant example of a counter-revolution |
We have just had the response. It struck at the weak spot in the Egyptian social fabric: the sectarian question. That spot has grown more and more tender after decades of mounting tension between Egyptian Muslims and Copts, the root cause of which is to be found in the practices of the Mubarak regime. Through systematic discrimination that kept Christians out of public office and, hence, out of the public political sphere, that regime forced Copts to huddle in their churches behind their spiritual leaders, through whose mediacy the regime ensured the Christian vote for its political party and the party leader.
Several days before El-Adli was arrested, the Ministry of Interior dismissed several top State Security officers who joined the ranks of other personnel of that agency who had been variously fired or marginalised after the 25 January Revolution. One of those officers was in charge of the sectarian file in Egypt and familiar with every detail of this sensitive issue. Those officers were aided by some 400,000 thugs who had put themselves at the service of the corrupt members of the police, most members of the once ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) and parliament, and a number of business magnates complicit in the plundering of public moneys, which is to say the people who, together with other members of the former ruling party and businessmen who were harmed by the revolution, form the core of the counter-revolution.
Today, that disbanded army of thugs now largely numbers among the unemployed. No longer in demand and unwanted, they are filled with spite, and yearn for their old world and for the paymasters who filled their pockets with money from the public coffers. Therefore, they are eminently recruitable through offers of pay or through their old connections, and their resentful energies are easily harnessed into performing any sort of atrocity that feeds the counter-revolution.
There is evidence that strongly suggests that the events in Imbaba on Saturday were planned. Eyewitnesses confirm the presence of thugs and other information indicates that security officers were also instrumental. True, the incident may have been sparked by a group of Salafis who claimed that a woman who had converted to Islam was being held captive in the Mar Mina Church in Imbaba. However, there is little doubt that, in the ensuing confusion, agents from the former regime stepped in to stoke sectarian tension in the hope of creating civil strife in order to abort the revolution.
People in Egypt are deeply disturbed by the sectarian violence that reared its head again, in Imbaba this time, and the ulterior motive behind which is as plain as day. They are looking to the Higher Council of the Armed Forces (HCAF) to take firm and decisive action. Although the HCAF has assumed power for only an interim period until it hands control to an elected civil government, it is currently the effective political authority and the maintainer of law and order through the enforcement of the law which is, therefore, its responsibility. Clearly, one of its foremost tasks at this delicate phase is to restore and sustain stability and security, which are essential if the revolution is to succeed in stimulating production and laying the groundwork for a new order whose chief pillars are democracy and development.
It follows that "passive neutrality" is not the appropriate stance to take in the face of the forces conspiring to sew death and destruction in Egypt. Nor are traditional tribal methods the way to handle the abhorrent sectarian events. Instead, the law must be enforced and its full weight must be made to apply to all, so as to deter anyone who so much as contemplates tampering with our national unity which, alongside the Nile, constitutes the backbone of Egyptian national security.
In addition to the outbreaks of strife in which the role of thugs is apparent, people are also perturbed by the spread of gangs extorting protection money from shop owners in popular neighbourhoods in particular. Fighting such a phenomenon is no small order. Yet while the HCAF has ratified the law to combat thuggery, the actions it has taken to put it into effect still fall short of the level needed to ensure sustained peace and security. Hopefully it will bear in mind that those who sew terror, assault peaceful citizens, attack holy places and foment civil strife can not be handled gently or with kid gloves under any pretext.
Obviously this issue concerns the government of Essam Sharaf as well. Unfortunately, his minister of interior appears to lack the skills and vigour necessary to cope with this delicate phase in our country's life. Most police officers are slack in their responsibilities. Some continue to exploit their power over the people while others simply refuse to work, as though unable to tolerate a climate of normality. There is only one answer to such behaviour. They must be told in no uncertain terms that if they do not resume the proper exercise of their duties they will be brought before a disciplinary board. Egypt, today, cannot afford to go easy on officers who fail to perform their duties or who betray the oath they took when they graduated from the police academy.
Finally, the current situation in the country confirms how dangerous it is not to isolate the members of the defunct NDP politically or, at least, not to dissolve that party's fraudulent municipal councils that are still in power. It further indicates how necessary it is to apprehend and prosecute the criminal elements among the second and third tiers of the old regime.
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